Abstract. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for an instance of a weighted cooperative matching game. This resolves a long-standing open question posed in [Faigle, Kern, Fekete, Hochstättler, Mathematical Programming, 1998].
Introduction
Imagine a network of players that form partnerships to generate value. For example, maybe a tennis league pairing players to play exhibition matches [3] , or people making trades in an exchange network [47] . These are examples of what are called matching games. In a (weighted) matching game, we are given a graph G = (V, E), weights w : E → R ≥0 , the player set is the set V of nodes of G, and w(uv) denotes the value earned when u and v collaborate. Each coalition S ⊆ V is assigned a value ν(S) so that ν(S) is equal to the value of a maximum weight matching on the induced subgraph G [S] . The special case of matching games where w = 1 is the all-ones vector, and G is bipartite is called an assignment game and was introduced in a classical paper by Shapley and Shubik [47] , and was later generalized to general graphs by Deng, Ibaraki, and Nagamochi [12] .
We are interested in what a fair redistribution of the total value ν(V ) to the players in the network looks like. The field of cooperative game theory gives us the language to make this question formal. A vector x ∈ R V is called an allocation if x(V ) = ν(V ) (where we use x(V ) as a short-hand for i∈V x(i) as usual). Given such an allocation, we let x(S) − ν(S) be the excess of coalition S ⊆ V . This quantity can be thought of as a measure of the satisfaction of coalition S. A fair allocation should maximize the bottleneck excess, i.e. maximize the minimum excess, and this can be accomplished by an LP: max ε (P ) s.t. x(S) ≥ ν(S) + ε for all S ⊆ V x(V ) = ν(V )
Let ε * be the optimum value of (P ), and define P (ε * ) to be the set of allocations x such that (x, ε * ) is feasible for (P ). The set P (ε * ) is known as the leastcore [39] of the given cooperative game, and the special case when ε * = 0, P (0) is the well-known core [25] of (V, ν). Intuitively, allocations in the core describe payoffs in which no coalition of players could profitably deviate from the grand coalition V .
Why stop at maximizing the bottleneck excess? Consider an allocation which, subject to maximizing the smallest excess, maximizes the second smallest excess, and subject to that maximizes the third smallest excess, and so on. This process of successively optimizing the excess of the worst-off coalitions yields our primary object of interest, the nucleolus. For an allocation x ∈ R V , let θ(x) ∈ R 2 V −2 be the vector obtained by sorting the list of excess values x(S) − ν(S) for any ∅ = S ⊂ V in non-decreasing order 3 . The nucleolus, denoted η(V, ν) and defined by Schmeidler [45] , is the unique allocation that lexicographically maximizes θ(x): η(V, ν) := arg lex max{θ(x) : x ∈ P (ε * )}.
We refer the reader to Appendix B for an example instance of the weighted matching game with its nucleolus. We now have sufficient terminology to state our main result:
Theorem 1. Given a graph G = (V, E) and weights w : E → R, the nucleolus η(V, ν) of the corresponding weighted matching game can be computed in polynomial time.
Despite its intricate definition the concept of the nucleolus is surprisingly ancient. Its history can be traced back to a discussion on bankruptcy division in the Babylonian Talmud [1] . Modern research interest in the nucleolus stems not only from its geometric beauty [39] , or several practical applications (e.g., see [5, 38] ), but from the strange way problems of computing the nucleolus fall in the complexity landscape, seeming to straddle the NP vs P boundary.
Beyond being one of the most fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization, starting with the founding work of Kuhn on the Hungarian method for the assignment problem [35] , matching problems have historically teetered on the cusp of hardness. For example, prior to Edmonds' celebrated Blossom Algorithm [15, 14] it was not clear whether Maximum Matching belonged in P. For another example, until Rothvoß' landmark result [44] it was thought that the matching polytope could potentially have sub-exponential extension complexity. In cooperative game theory, matchings live up to their historical pedigree of representing a challenging problem class. The long standing open problem in this area was whether the nucleolus of a weighted matching game instance can be computed in polynomial time. The concept of the nucleolus has been known since 1969 [45] , and the question was posed as an important open problem in multiple papers. In 1998, Faigle, Kern, Fekete, and Hochstättler [18] mention the problem in their work on the nucleon, a multiplicative-error analog to the nucleolus which they show is polynomial time computable. Kern and Paulusma state the question of computing the nucleolus for general matching games as an important open problem in 2003 [30] . In 2008, Deng and Fang [10] conjectured this problem to be NP-hard, and in 2017 Biró, Kern, Paulusma, and Wojuteczky [4] reaffirmed this problem as an interesting open question. Theorem 1 settles the question, providing a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the nucleolus of a general instance of a weighted cooperative matching game.
Our approach to proving Theorem 1 is to provide a compact description of each feasible region polytope in a hierarchical sequence of linear programs described in the well-known Maschler scheme [34, 39] for computing the nucleolus. While there are a linear number of LPs in the sequence, their naive implementation requires an exponential number of constraints. The base LP for this approach is the least core. It is known how to separate over the least core, but the challenge lies in solving all successive linear programs in the sequence. Previous results in [31, 42] made use of the unweighted nature of node-weighted instances of matching games, and were able to employ the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem to derive compact formulations for the LPs in Maschler's hierarchy. We do not know how to extend this line of work beyond node-weighted instances.
In our work, we identify a minimal family of tight excess constraints of (P ) corresponding to coalitions whose vertices are saturated by so called universal matchings. A matching is universal if it saturates a coalition of vertices that is tight for all allocations in the least core. As we will show, universal matchings are the optimal matchings for carefully chosen cost functions derived from so called universal allocations (see Section 2.2). From here now, we rely on well-known characterizations of extreme points of matching polyhedra, and the fact that these are defined by laminar families of blossom constraints. Ultimately, the above allows us to obtain a decomposition of the input graph into the edges on either the inside or outside of blossoms. The structure of the associated optimum face of the matching polytope (e.g., see Schrijver [46] ) elucidates the structure of excess over all coalitions in the matching game. Our proof uses a critical insight into the symmetric nature of exchange on the nodes of a blossom as we move between leastcore allocations (see Lemma 5) . We present the details of the leastcore LP in Section 2. We show how this formulation can be used in Maschler's framework to compute the nucleolus in Section 3.
Prior to our work, the nucleolus was known to be polynomial-time computable only in structured instances of the matching game. Solymosi and Raghavan [48] showed how to compute the nucleolus in an (unweighted) assignment game instance in polynomial time. Kern and Paulusma [31] later provided an efficient algorithm to compute the nucleolus in general unweighted matching game instances. Paulusma [42] extended the work in [31] and gave an efficient algorithm to compute the nucleolus in matching games where edge weights are induced by node potentials. Farczadi [23] finally extended Paulusma's framework further using the concept of extendible allocations. We note also that it is easy to compute the nucleolus in weighted instances of the matching game with non-empty core. For such instances, the leastcore has a simple compact description that does not include constraints for coalitions of size greater than 2. Thus it is relatively straightforward to adapt the iterative algorithm of Maschler [39] to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the nucleolus (e.g., see [23, Chapter 2.3] for the details, Section 1.3 for an overview).
Related Work
In a manner analogous to how we have defined matching games, a wide variety combinatorial optimization games can be defined [12] . In such games, the value of a coalition S of players is succinctly given as the optimal solution to an underlying combinatorial optimization problem. It is natural to conjecture that the complexity of computing the nucleolus in an instance of such a game would fall in lock-step with the complexity of the underlying problem. Surprisingly this is not the case. For instance, computing the nucleolus is known to be NP-hard for network flow games [11] , weighted threshold games [16] , and spanning tree games [19, 22] . On the other hand, polynomial time algorithms are known for finding the nucleolus of special cases of flow games, certain classes of matching games, fractional matching games, and convex games [2, 6, 11, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31, 36, 40, 42, 43, 48] .
One application of cooperative matching games is to network bargaining [13, 50] , where one considers a population of players that are interconnected by an underlying social network. Players engage in profitable partnerships -each player with at most one of its neighbours. The profit generated through a partnership then needs to be shared between the participating players in an equitable way. Cook and Yamagishi [7] first proposed an elegant profit-sharing model that not only generalizes Nash's famous 2-player bargaining solution [41] , but also validates empirical findings from the lab setting. Cook and Yamagishi's model defines a so called outside option for each player v that essentially denotes the largest share that v could demand in a partnership with any of its neighbours. An outcome is called stable if each player receives a profit share that is at least her outside option, and an outcome is balanced if value generated in excess of the sum of the outside options of the involved players is shared evenly. Kleinberg and Tardos [32] showed that an instance of network bargaining has a balanced outcome if and only if it has a stable outcome. Bateni et al. [2] later noted that stable outcomes for network bargaining correspond to elements of the core of the underlying cooperative matching game, and that balanced outcomes correspond to elements in the intersection of core and prekernel.
It is well-known that the prekernel of a cooperative game may be non-convex and that it may even be disconnected [34, 49] . Despite this, Faigle, Kern and Kuipers [20] showed how to compute a point in the intersection of prekernel and leastcore in polynomial time under the reasonable assumption that the game has a polynomial time oracle to compute the minimum excess coalition for a given allocation. Later the same authors [21] refine their result to computing a point in the intersection of the core and lexicographic kernel, a set which is also known to contain the nucleolus. Bateni et al. pose as an open question the existence of an efficiently computable, balanced and unique way of sharing the profit. It is well-known that the nucleolus lies in the intersection of core and prekernel (if these are non-empty) and is always unique [45] . Theorem 1 therefore resolves the latter open question left in [2] .
Connections have also been made between matching games and stable matchings. Allocations in the core of the corresponding matching game have been found to be in 1-to-1 correspondence with stable matchings with payments, a variant of the Gale and Shapley's [24] famous stable marriage problem. See Koopmans and Beckmann [33] , Shapley and Shubik [47] , Eriksson and Karlander [17] , and Biro, Kern, and Paulusma [3] for details.
Leastcore and Core of Matching Games.
It is straightforward to see that (P ) can be rewritten equivalently as max ε
where M is the set of all matchings M on G, and x(M ) is a shorthand for x(V (M )). The separation problem for the linear program (P 1 ) can be reduced to finding a maximum weight matching in the graph G with edge weights w(uv) − x(uv), uv ∈ E (where we use x(uv) as a shorthand for x(u) + x(v)). Since the maximum weight matching can be found in polynomial time [14] , we know that the linear program (P 1 ) can be solved in polynomial time as well [29] .
We use ε 1 to denote the optimal value of (P 1 ) and P 1 (ε 1 ) for the set of allocations x such that (x, ε 1 ) is feasible for the leastcore linear program (P 1 ). In general, for a value ε and a linear program Q on variables in R V × R we denote by Q(ε) the set {x ∈ R V : (x, ε) is feasible for Q}. Note that ε 1 ≤ 0. Indeed, ε ≤ 0 in any feasible solution (x, ε) to (P 1 ) as otherwise x(M ) would need to exceed w(M ) for all matchings M . In particular this would also hold for a maximum weight matching on G, implying that x(V ) > ν(G). If ε 1 = 0 then the core of the cooperative matching game is non-empty. One can see that ε 1 = 0 if and only if the value of a maximum weight matching on G with weights w equals the value of a maximum weight fractional matching. This follows since x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) is a fractional weighted node cover of value ν(G) when ε 1 = 0. When ε 1 < 0, we say that the cooperative matching game has an empty core. The matching game instance given in Appendix B has an empty core.
In this paper, we assume that the cooperative matching game (G, w) has an empty core, as computing the nucleolus is otherwise well-known to be doable in polynomial time [42] .
Maschler's scheme
As discussed, our approach to proving Theorem 1 relies on Maschler's scheme. The scheme requires us to solve a linear number of LPs: {(P j )} j≥1 that we now define. (P 1 ) is the leastcore LP that we have already seen in Section 1.2. LPs (P j ) for j ≥ 2 are defined inductively. Crucial in their definition is the notion of fixed coalitions that we introduce first. For a polyhedron Q ⊆ R V we denote by Fix(Q) the collection of sets S ⊆ V such that x(S) is constant over the polyhedron Q, i.e. With this we are now ready to state LP (P j ) for j ≥ 2:
where ε j be the optimal value of the linear program (P j ). Let j * be the minimum number j such that P j (ε j ) contains a single point. This point is the nucleolus of the game [9] . It is well-known [39] that P j−1 (ε j−1 ) ⊂ P j ( j ) and ε j−1 < ε j for all j. Since the dimension of the polytope describing feasible solutions of (P j ) decreases in every round until the dimension becomes zero, we have j * ≤ |V | [39] [42, . Therefore, in order to find the nucleolus of the cooperative matching game efficiently it suffices to solve each linear program (P j ), j = 1, . . . , j * in polynomial time. We accomplish this by providing polynomial-size formulations for (P j ) for all j ≥ 1.
In Section 2 we introduce the concept of universal matchings which are fundamental to our approach, and give a compact formulation for the first linear program in Maschler's Scheme, the leastcore. We also present our main technical lemma, Lemma 5, which provides a crucial symmetry condition on the values allocations can take over the vertices of blossoms in the graph decomposition we use to describe the compact formulation. In Section 3 we describe the successive linear programs in Maschler's Scheme and provide a compact formulation for each one in a matching game.
Leastcore Formulation.
In this section we provide a polynomial-size description of (P 1 ). It will be useful to define a notation for excess: for any x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) and M ∈ M let excess(x, M ) := x(M ) − w(M ).
Universal Matchings, Universal Allocations.
For each x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) we say that a matching M ∈ M is an x-tight matching whenever excess(x, M ) = ε 1 . We denote by M x the set of x-tight matchings. A universal matching M ∈ M is a matching which is x-tight for all x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ). We denote the set of universal matchings on G by M uni . A universal allocation x * ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) is a leastcore point whose x * -tight matchings are precisely the set of universal matchings, i.e. M x * = M uni . Lemma 1. There exists a universal allocation x * ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ).
Proof. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that every x * in the relative interior (see [51, Lemma 2.9(ii)]) of P 1 (ε 1 ) is a universal allocation. If the relative interior is empty then P 1 (ε 1 ) is a singleton, which trivially contains a universal allocation. In Appendix A we provide a combinatorial proof.
Lemma 2. A universal allocation x * ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. A point x * in the relative interior of P 1 (ε 1 ) can be found in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method (Theorem 6.5.5 [28] , [8] ). Since any allocation x * from the relative interior of P 1 (ε 1 ) is a universal allocation, this implies the statement of the lemma.
Given a non-universal allocation x and a universal allocation x * , we observe that M x * ⊂ M x and so θ(x * ) is strictly lexicographically greater than θ(x). Thus the nucleolus is a universal allocation. We emphasize that M x * = M uni is invariant under the (not necessarily unique) choice of universal allocations x * . Henceforth we fix a universal allocation x * ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ).
Description for Convex Hull of Universal Matchings.
By the definition of universal allocation x * , a matching M is universal if and only if it is x * -tight. Thus, M is a universal matching if and only if its characteristic vector lies in the optimal face of the matching polytope corresponding to (the maximization of) the linear objective function assigning weight − excess(x * , uv) = w(uv) − x * (uv) to each edge uv ∈ E. Let O be the set of node sets S ⊆ V such that |S| ≥ 3, |S| is odd. Edmonds [14] gave a linear description of the matching polytope of G as the set of y ∈ R E satisfying:
Thus, a matching M ∈ M is universal if and only if it satisfies the constraints
where W is some subset of V , L is a subset of O, and F is a subset of E. Using an uncrossing argument, as in [37, Pages 141-150], we may assume that the collection of sets L is a laminar family of node sets; i.e., for any two distinct sets S, T ∈ L, either S ∩ T = ∅ or S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S.
Lemma 3. For every node v ∈ V there exists M ∈ M uni such that v is exposed by M . Hence, W = ∅.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there exists a node v ∈ V such that v ∈ W . First, note that there always exists a non-universal matching M ∈ M \ M uni since otherwise the empty matching would be universal, and thus
implying that the core of the given matching game instance is non-empty. Suppose first that there exists a node u ∈ V exposed by some matching M ∈ M uni such that x * u > 0. We define
Recall that M uni is the set of maximum weight matchings on G with respect to the node weights w(uv) − x * (uv), uv ∈ E, i.e. M uni is the set of x * -tight matchings. Moreover, recall that excess(x * , M ) = ε 1 for M ∈ M uni . Thus, we have δ 0 > 0.
We define δ := min{δ 0 , x * u } > 0 and a new allocation x as follows:
otherwise.
Since all universal matchings contain v, the excess with respect to x of any universal matching is no smaller than their excess with respect to x * . Therefore, by our choice of δ, (x , 1 ) is a feasible, and hence optimal, solution for (P 1 ). But M is not x -tight, since M covers v and exposes u. This contradicts that M is a universal matching. Now consider the other case: for all u ∈ V if u is exposed by a universal matching then x * u = 0. Then, for every universal matching M ∈ M uni we have
Since ν(G) is the maximum weight of a matching on G with respect to the weights w, we get that ε 1 ≥ 0. Thus x * is in the core, contradicting our assumption that the core is empty.
Description of Leastcore.
We denote inclusion-wise maximal sets in the family L as S * 1 , S * 2 , . . . , S * k . We define the edge set E + to be the set of edges in G such that at most one of its nodes is in S * i for every i ∈ [k] := {1, . . . , k}, i.e.
, there exists a universal matching M ∈ M uni such that the node set covered by M is as follows
Proof. By Lemma 3, we know that for every i ∈ [k] there exists a universal matching M vi ∈ M uni such that v i is exposed by M vi . Now, for every i ∈ [k], let us define
Since M i satisfies all laminar family constraints in L for subsets of S * i we have that
is a matching satisfying all the constraints (1), and hence is a universal matching covering the desired nodes. For single nodes we use the shorthand diff(x, v) = diff(x, {v}). We now prove the following crucial structure result on allocations in the leastcore.
Lemma 5. For every leastcore allocation x, i.e. for every x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ), we have that
Proof. Consider u ∈ S * i , and note that we may use Lemma 4 to choose a universal matching M u covering precisely
Hence we have
. Using these observations we see that
showing (i). Now we prove (ii). Consider e ∈ E + where e = {u, v}. Since e ∈ E(S * i ) for all i ∈ [k], we can choose a universal matching M exposing u and v by Lemma 4. Thus M ∪ {e} is also a matching. Notice M is x-tight, and so we have excess(x, e) = excess(x, M ∪ {e})
as desired.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that x * is a fixed universal allocation in P 1 (ε 1 ). Let E * ⊆ E denote the union of universal matchings, i.e. E * = ∪ M ∈Muni M . We now define linear program (P 1 ).
excess(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E * excess(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E + excess(x, M * ) = ε
Let ε 1 be the optimal value of the linear program (P 1 ). We now show that P 1 (ε 1 ) is indeed a compact description of the leastcore P 1 (ε 1 ).
Theorem 2. We have ε 1 = ε 1 and P 1 (ε 1 ) = P 1 (ε 1 ).
Proof. First, we show that
Lemma 5(ii) shows that excess(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E + , and excess(x, M * ) = ε 1 holds by the universality of M * . It remains to show that excess(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E * .
Suppose for contradiction there exists e ∈ E * such that excess(x, e) > 0. By the definition of E * , there exists a universal matching M containing e. Since M is universal, excess(x, M ) = ε 1 . But by our choice of e,
contradicting that x is in P 1 (ε 1 ). Thus we showed that (x, ε 1 ) is feasible for (P 1 ), i.e. we showed that P 1 (ε 1 ) ⊆ P 1 (ε 1 ).
To complete the proof we show that P 1 (ε 1 ) ⊆ P 1 (ε 1 ). Let x be an allocation in P 1 (ε 1 ). Due to the description of the linear program (P 1 ), it is enough to show that for every matching M ∈ M we have excess(x, M ) ≥ ε 1 .
Since excess(x, e) ≥ 0 for alle ∈ E + , it suffices to consider only the matchings M , which are unions of matchings on the graphs
. Then due to constraints (2) in (P 1 ) we have
where the last inequality follows since M ⊆ M * and excess(x, e) ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E * .
Thus, we showed that P 1 (ε 1 ) ⊆ P 1 (ε 1 ) and P 1 (ε 1 ) ⊆ P 1 (ε 1 ). Recall, that ε 1 and ε 1 are the optimal values of the linear programs (P 1 ) and (P 1 ) respectively. Thus, we have ε 1 = ε 1 and P 1 (ε 1 ) = P 1 (ε 1 ).
Computing the Nucleolus
The last section presented a polynomial-size formulation for the leastcore LP (P 1 ). In this section we complete our polynomial-time implementation of Maschler's scheme by showing that (P j ) has the following compact reformulation:
s.t. excess(x, e) ≥ ε − ε 1 for all e ∈ E + , e ∈ Fix(P j−1 (ε j−1 ))
for all e ∈ E * , e ∈ Fix(P j−1 (ε j−1 )) x ∈ P j−1 (ε j−1 ) , where ε j is the optimal value of the linear program (P j ) Theorem 3. For all j = 1, . . . , j * , we have ε j = ε j and P j (ε j ) = P j (ε j ).
Proof. We proceed by induction. For j = 1 the statement holds due to Theorem 2. Let us show that statement holds for each j = 2, . . . , j * , assuming that the statement holds for j − 1. By induction, P j−1 (ε j−1 ) = P j−1 (ε j−1 ). We let F := Fix(P j−1 (ε j−1 )) = Fix(P j−1 (ε j−1 )) to ease presentation.
First we show P j (ε j ) ⊆ P j (ε j ). Let x ∈ P j (ε j ). First consider an edge e ∈ E + \F. By Lemma 4 there exists a universal matching M ∈ M uni exposing the endpoints of e. Moreover, since V (M ) ∈ Fix(P 1 (ε 1 )) ⊆ F we have V (M ∪ {e}) ∈ F. Thus we see that
Now consider v ∈ V \F. Similar to the previous argument, but via Lemma 3, we can find a universal matching M exposing v. Thus, since M is universal, V (M ) ∪ {v} ∈ F. We also have ν(V (M ) ∪ {v}) ≥ w(M ), so
Finally consider e = {u, v} ∈ E * \F. Since e ∈ E * there exists a universal matching M ∈ M uni such that e is in M . Since V (M ) ∈ Fix(P 1 (ε 1 )) ⊆ F and {u, v} ∈ F, we see that M \ {e} ∈ F. Thus we have excess(x, e) = excess(x, M ) − excess(x, M \{e}) ≤ ε 1 − ε j as desired.
So we have shown P j (ε j ) ⊆ P j (ε j ), and thus it remains to show P j (ε j ) ⊆ P j (ε j ). Let x ∈ P j (ε j ) and let S ⊂ V such that S ∈ F. We need to show
Since S ∈ F, there exists v ∈ S such that {v} ∈ F. Let M be a maximum w-weight matching on
We proceed by case distinction.
Case 1: v ∈ S\V (M ). Since x ≥ 0 we have x(S) ≥ x(V (M ) ∪ {v}), and it suffices to prove that the right-hand side exceeds the weight of M by at least ε j . By assumption, x ∈ P j (ε j ) ⊆ P 1 (ε 1 ) = P 1 (ε 1 ), and hence excess(x, M ) ≥ 1 .
Together with x(v) ≥ ε j − ε 1 this yields the desired inequality. Case 2: v ∈ V (M ). The same argument as before applies if there is u ∈ S\V (M ) with {u} ∈ F. Therefore, we focus on the case where {u} ∈ F for all u ∈ S\V (M ). Then M contains an edge f such that f ∈ F. Again using x ≥ 0, it suffices to show that x(V (M )) ≥ j . We further distinguish cases: either
Here, the desired inequality follows from excess(x, M \{f }) ≥ ε 1 due to x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ) and from excess(x, f ) ≥ ε j − ε 1 .
Case 2b: f ∈ M \E + . If M ∩ E + has an edge that is not in F then we use the same argument as in Case 2a. So we may assume that all of the edges in M ∩ E + are in F. Now recall that x ∈ P 1 (ε 1 ), and hence excess(x, e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E + by Lemma 5.(ii). Thus, we may assume that V (M ) ∈ F and M ∩ E + = ∅. For each i ∈ [k] choose some node u i ∈ S * i exposed by M . By Lemma 4 there existsM ∈ M uni such that M exposes precisely u 1 , . . . , u k on L. Thus V (M ) ⊆ V (M ) and we see where the last inequality follows since excess(x, M * \(M ∪ {e})) ≤ 0 and x ∈ P j (ε j ), e ∈ E * \F.
With Theorem 3 we can replace each linear program (P j ) with (P j ) in Maschler's Scheme. Since the universal allocation x * , the node sets S * i , i ∈ [k], the edge set E + , and the edge set E * can all be computed in polynomial time, we have shown that the nucleolus of any cooperative matching game with empty core can be computed in polynomial time. Therefore we have shown Theorem 1.
Open Questions Matching Games generalize naturally to b-matching games, where instead the underlying optimization problem is to find an edge subset M with |M ∩δ(v)| ≤ b v for each node v. Biro, Kern, Paulusma, and Wojuteczky [4] showed that the core-separation problem when b v > 2 for some vertex v, is coNP-Hard. Despite this, the complexity of computing the nucleolus of these games is open.
Our algorithm relies heavily on the ellipsoid method. When the core is non-empty, there is a combinatorial algorithm for finding the nucleolus [3] . It would be interesting to develop a combinatorial algorithm for nucleolus computation of matching games in general.
